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The Fate of Mentally Retarded Criminals: An
Examination of the Propriety of Their Execution
Under the Eighth Amendment
INTRODUCTION

Capital punishment as an appropriate response to criminal
activity has come under increasing attack by those who wish to
abolish it. With scientific advances in DNA that could lead to the
exoneration of many death row inmates, new concerns regarding
the execution of undeserving persons have gained momentum.
These concerns have ballooned into a movement to eliminate what
some believe to be a barbaric and archaic practice. Proof of the
progress made by death penalty opponents is nowhere more
evident than in the nationwide movement to eliminate the
execution of the mentally retarded.
Eighteen states currently forbid the execution of mentally
retarded persons, and many others, including Pennsylvania, are
considering such action.1 Proponents of the death penalty in this
situation argue that mental retardation alone should not
automatically disqualify one from serving what a jury deems to be
an appropriate punishment; rather, the jury should consider
impaired intellect as a mitigating circumstance. The following
article explores the difficulties in establishing a class of persons
that should be protected, as well as the moral concerns
surrounding execution of the mentally retarded. Finally, this article
will examine the judicial and statutory status of the issue.

I.

DEFINITION OF MENTALLY RETARDED

Before participating in a debate on the propriety of the execution
of a person who suffers from mental retardation, one must first
understand the definition of such a condition. Although no single
1. Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas,
Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Carolina, New York, South
Dakota, Tennessee, and Washington have statutes barring the execution of the mentally
retarded. Death Penalty Information Center, Mental Retardationand the Death Penalty, at
httpJ/www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/dpicmr.htnl (last visited Aug. 7, 2001). The Pennsylvania
Legislature is currently considering two bills that would eliminate the execution of the
mentally retarded. S. SB 26, (Pa. 2001) and H.R. HB 1861, (Pa. 2001).
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definition exists, the American Association of Mental Retardation's
("AAMR") revised definition of 1992 remains the most widely used
and generally accepted.2 The AAMR describes mental retardation
as "substantial limitations in present functioning ... characterized
by significantly subaverage intellectual functioning, existing concurrently with, related to limitations in two or more applicable
adaptive skill areas, and manifestation before age eighteen."3 In
assumptions
addition to these criteria, the AAMR lists four primary
4
definition:
the
of
application
proper
for
required
(1)

(2)

(3)
(4)

Valid assessment considers cultural and linguistic
diversity, as well as differences in communications and
behavioral factors;
The existence of limitations in adaptive skills occurs
within the context of community environments typical of
the individual's age peers and is indexed to the person's
individualized needs for supports;
Specific adaptive limitations often coexist with strengths
in other adaptive skills or other personal capabilities; and
With appropriate supports over a sustained period, the
life functioning of the person with mental retardation will
5
generally improve.

Once the aforementioned assumptions are met, the various facets
of the definition are examined.
The first facet of the AAMR definition requires that an individual6
function at an intellectual level significantly below average.
Intellectual functioning is determined by means of an Intelligence
Quotient ("IQ") test. The test score assesses a person's intellectual
functioning as compared to other test takers.7 According to
statistics, most people score between 80-120, with 100 as the
2.

AMERICAN ASSOCIATION

ON MENTAL RETARDATION,

MENTAL RETARDATION:

DEFINITION,

SUPPORTS (9th ed. 1992) [hereinafter AAMR]. Since 1921, the
AAMR has defined mental retardation. Id. It should be noted that the AAMR has
implemented an Ad hoc Committee for the purpose of updating this definition with changes
in the field. AAMR, Ad hoc Committee on Terminology and Classification, at http://
www.aamr.org/Groups/t&c.shtnl (last visited Nov. 3, 2001). This committee plans to propose
an updated definition of mental retardation during 2002. Id.
3. AAMR, supra note 2, at 5.
4. Id.
CLASSIFICATION, AND SYSTEMS OF

5.

Id.

6. Id.
7. Rosa Ehrenreich and Jamie Fellner, Beyond Reason: The Death Penalty and
Offenders with Mental Retardation (Malcolm Smart and Cynthia Brown eds., Human Rights
Watch) (2001).
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average score.8 To be diagnosed as mentally retarded, an individual
must score below 70-75 on the IQ test.9 Only an estimated two
percent of the American population scores below 70 on the IQ
test.'0 The diagnosing score has been lowered over the years due to
the social stigma associated with being labeled retarded."
Currently, the significance of a low IQ score is more easily
understood through its reference to mental age.' 2 For instance, a
person said to have the mental age of a five year-old scored
roughly the same as the average five year-old who took the IQ
test.13

A low IQ score alone does not necessarily indicate mental
retardation. As the AAMR definition suggests, this low intellectual
functioning must coexist with, and relate to, deficiencies in at least
two of the adaptive skill areas necessary for every day life. 4 These
skill areas include communication, home living, community use,
health and safety, leisure, self-care, social skills, self-direction,
functional academics, and work. 15 Adaptive behavior is defined as
"significant limitations in an individual's effectiveness in meeting
the standards of maturation, learning, personal independence, or
social responsibility that are expected for his or her age level and
cultural group, as determined by clinical assessment and
standardized scales." 6 In other words, the second element of the
definition requires the impaired intellect to have some real impact
7
on the individual's life.'
The final element of the AAMR definition mandates a
manifestation of mental retardation before the individual reaches
the age of eighteen.'8 Because mental retardation develops during
childhood, the definition precludes the possibility that a normal
adult suddenly becomes mentally retarded. 9 Therefore, an adult
8. Ehrenreich & Fellner, supra note 7, at 9.
9. Id.
10.

Id.

11. Id. at 10.
12. Ehrenreich & Fellner, supra note 7, at 9. It should be noted that this imprecise
mechanism is generally used to enhance the lay person's understanding only. Id.
13. Id.
14. AAMR, supra note 2, at 6.
15. Id.
16. James W Ellis & Ruth A- Luckasson, Mentally Retarded Criminal Defendants, GEO.
WASH. L Rev. 414, 422 (1985).
17. Id."
18. AAMR, supra note 2, at 6.
19. Ehrenreich & Feiner, supra note 7, at 11.
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cannot feign the condition.20 To assess the validity of a mental
retardation diagnosis, examiners, such as psychologists or
counselors, study childhood test results and school records to
determine if the individual's "intellectual and adaptive problems
21
developed during childhood."
II.

CLASSIFICATION OF THE MENTALLY RETARDED

As described above, the AAMR revised the definition of mental
retardation in 1992.22 The revised definition emphasizes the
importance of culture and environment in properly identifying and
classifying the conditions under which a person may be diagnosed
with mental retardation. 23 The current classifying system continues
to use IQ scores as part of the definition. However, the system no
longer uses the classifications of mild, moderate, severe, and
profound to describe the degree of retardation. 24 Instead, the new
AAMR classifications are characterized by the level of support
needed by the individual to function in the adaptive skill areas,
distinguishing the support levels with terms such as intermittent,
25
limited, extensive, and pervasive.
The classification process consists of three steps.26 First, the
process requires the individual to take standardized intelligence
tests given by a qualified professional such as a psychologist. 27 The
second step involves discerning the person's strengths and
weaknesses across four areas of daily functioning that include:
"intellectual and adaptive behavior skills, psychological/emotional
and
considerations
physical/health/etiological
considerations,
environmental considerations." 28 During the final step of the
process, an interdisciplinary team determines the type of support
the individual needs in any of the four dimensions of daily living.
Once identified, the needed support is assigned one of four levels
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. AAMR, supra note 2, at 5-8.
23. Id. at 9-22. The change in classification schemes helps to explain a person's
impairments better than mere IQ test scores. Id.

24. Id. at 34.
25. Id. at 26.
26. Id. at 24.
27. AAMR, supra note 2, at 24.
28. Id. Strengths and weaknesses may be determined by formal testing, observations,
interviewing key people in the individual's life, interviewing the individual, interacting with
the person in his or her daily life, or a combination of these approaches. Id.
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of intensity: intermittent, limited, extensive or pervasive.29
Ill.

CAUSES OF MENTAL RETARDATION

Mental retardation can be caused by almost any syndrome,
disease, or genetic abnormality that impairs the brain either before
birth, during birth, or until age eighteen.30 Despite the fact that
many causes have been discovered, for roughly one-third of the
people affected by this condition, the cause still remains
unknown. 31 Down syndrome, fetal alcohol syndrome, and fragile X
32
are the major causes of mental retardation.
The causes of mental retardation can be delineated into
categories which include genetic disorders, prenatal complications,
neonatal problems, postnatal trauma, and childhood poverty. 33 The
genetic causes may result from inheritance of abnormal
chromosomes, an erroneous gene combination, or infections during
pregnancy. 34 A chromosomal disorder such as Down Syndrome
occurs when too many or too few chromosomes exist.3 5 Sometimes,
though, mental retardation finds its roots in the behavior of the
mother during the term of her pregnancy. 36 Maternal smoking,
alcohol consumption, and drug use have all been proven to
potentially cause the condition. 37 Likewise, problems at birth, such
as low birth weight and premature delivery, sometimes cause
mental retardation in babies. 38 Similarly, problems after birth such
as exposure to, and incubation of, chicken pox, measles, or other
childhood diseases can damage the brain and also cause the
condition. 39 Finally, poverty may lead to mental retardation,
especially whenever malnutrition and disease-producing conditions
29. Id. The four levels can be roughly defined as follows: intermittent - support
offered "as needed" but not on a daily basis; limited - support granted during a prescribed
length of time (for example, a transition to a new school from an old school); extensive unlimited support given on a daily basis according to needs; and pervasive - unlimited
support constantly administered across all areas of life. Id. at 26.
30. The Arc of the United States, Introduction to Mental Retardation, at http'/l
www.thearc.org/faqs/mrqahtml (last visited Aug. 7, 2001) [hereinafter ARC].
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. ARC, supra note 30.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
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are present.40
IV.

REASONS FOR PROTECTING MENTALLY RETARDED INDIVIDUALS FROM

EXECUTION

Those who advocate prohibiting the execution of the mentally
retarded demand the protection of these individuals from capital
punishment for several reasons. Citing the definition of mental
retardation discussed earlier in this article, advocates emphasize
the differences between a "normal" person and one who suffers
from this troublesome condition, thereby attempting to strengthen
the position of exempting mentally retarded defendants from
possible capital punishment.
A.

Why the Mentally Retarded Fail to Meet Culpability Standards

Because mentally retarded individuals experience severe
limitations in intellect, as well as an inability to participate in
everyday activities, the individual is subject to a seemingly endless
array of potential problems as a court debates whether or not to
deal them the most severe punishment. The problems with holding
the mentally impaired to the same standard as the unimpaired
become more evident after consideration of the characteristics
commonly possessed by the mentally retarded: a lack of effective
communication skills, an extremely limited attention span, a
tendency for impulsivity, and a deficiency in moral development.
Furthermore, other characteristics include a strong desire to hide
their disability and a need to please their peers. 41 These
characteristics repeatedly emerge to give credence to the claim that
we should spare the mentally retarded from the penalty of death.
Although the United States currently allows the death penalty,
the laws governing its implementation require only that the most
culpable or deserving individuals receive this punishment. In fact,
the Supreme Court stated that the decision to impose the death
penalty must be "directly related to the personal culpability of the
criminal defendant."42 The moral culpability of a defendant
comprises of two ingredients: (1) an individual's level of intellectual
function; and (2) the individual's ability to control and understand
40. ARC, supra note 30.
41. Shruti S. B. Desai, Effective Capital Representation of the Mentally Retarded
Defendant, 13 CAP. DEF. J. 251 (2001).
42. California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 543 (1987).
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the wrongfulness of his behavior.43 In both areas, a mentally
retarded individual is less capable, and therefore, less culpable than
an unimpaired person.44
To determine the moral culpability of a defendant, the jury
should consider the extent of the alleged criminal's intellectual
functioning. This criterion, however, precludes a person with
mental retardation who, by definition, functions at a significantly
sub-average intelligence level. Impairments caused by mental
retardation are severe, permanent, and pervasive, and have the
45
potential to negatively affect all aspects of the individual's life.
The intellectual impairments of a mentally retarded individual,
along with the impaired moral reasoning caused by his condition,
constitute a strong argument for him not to be placed in the "most
culpable" group for whom the death penalty is supposed to be
reserved.
The second component of moral culpability refers to the
defendant's capacity to understand and control his wrongful
behavior. 46 A person with mental retardation possesses no ability to
predict the consequences of his behavior, nor the ability to
vicariously learn from the consequences of another wrongdoer's
actions. 47 Thus, a mentally retarded individual cannot perceive
consequences of another's behavior, such as punishment for a
criminal act as a deterring example to discourage similar behavior
from him.
Based on the preceding statement, a deterrence justification for
executing an individual with mental retardation does not seem
logical, especially because such a person often cannot comprehend
the relativity of another's punishment to himself.48 Furthermore, a
retribution theory fails to warrant the death penalty because of the
individual's impairment to control impulsive behavior or develop
moral reasoning. 49 Though a mentally retarded person should be
held accountable for his behavior, he should not be subjected to
the death penalty for behavior he can neither control nor
conceptualize as indecent. Only those most blameworthy should
43.

Texas Defender Service, A STATE OF DENIAL: TEXAS JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY,

at http'/justice.policy.netcjreforn/studies/texasdefenders/chap
Jul. 28, 2001).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Texas Defender Service, supra note 43.
49. Id.

ter5.vtml#N 71

(last visited
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receive such a penalty; thus the definition of moral culpability, a
prerequisite that must be met for capital punishment, does not
include mentally retarded individuals.
A person's legal accountability for murder or other serious
crimes should not be contingent on the issue of the offender's
condition of mental retardation. 50 In other words, a mentally
retarded murderer should not receive exoneration from any
responsibility for his actions; however, the punishment must be
"proportionate to both the seriousness of the crime and the
defendant's degree of moral culpability."51 Although different levels
of severity of mental retardation exist, all include severe limitations
on the intellect and the ability of an individual to know the
wrongfulness in committing an act.5 2 Thus, many proponents
believe that mentally retarded defendants should never be placed in
the "most culpable" category, subject to the death penalty.5
B.

The Mentally Retardeds' Inability to Participate in
Criminal Justice System

the

In addition to the claim that mentally retarded defendants have
less moral culpability than defendants with average intelligence,
one can also easily argue that retarded defendants have a much
more limited ability to participate in the criminal justice system.r4
Because of the characteristics of the mentally retarded, a tendency
exists for injustices to occur, beginning with the police
investigation, continuing through the entire trial process, and,
unfortunately, sometimes leading to the execution chamber.5
The traits synonymous with those suffering from mental
retardation deeply depreciate a retarded individual's chances of
receiving fair treatment during a police investigation. In many
instances, a mentally retarded person will act extremely upset for
being detained or will try to escape the scene of a crime even if he
did nothing wrong.5 Also, a person with mental retardation may
respond to coercion more easily than would a person of average
intelligence, whether that coercion occurs by way of friendly
50. Ehrenreich & Felner, supra note 7, at 28.
51. Id. (quoting Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987)).
52. Ehrenreich & Fellner, supra note 7, at 28.
53. Id.
54. Texas Defender Service, supra note 43.
55.

Id.

56. Leigh Ann Davis, People with Mental Retardationin the CriminalJustice System,
at http-J/www.thearc.org/faqs/crimqa.html (last visited Jul. 27, 2001).
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suggestions or harsh intimidation.57 Often, an individual with mental
retardation experiences a deep need to be accepted and will
respond to questions in a way that he thinks will please the
interrogator.58 This need for acceptance may lead the individual to
falsely confess or exaggerate their level of involvement in a crime. 59
False confessions involving mentally retarded suspects in capital
crimes occur much too frequently. 60 Subjected to police questioning
and wanting to give the authorities the "right answers," alleged
criminals with mental retardation recurrently offer mendacious
statements. Because of his impaired thought process, the suspect
erroneously accepts guilt, assuming that the police officer's
allegation presupposes his responsibility in perpetuating the
crime. 61 Therefore, he confesses to a crime that he did not commit,
thereby "corroborating" the police officer's belief in his culpability.
The problem is exacerbated after considering that police officers
often do not have sufficient experience with mentally retarded
suspects to form a proper line of questioning to ascertain the true
facts of the crime. 62 Often a mentally retarded person will
acquiesce to the line of questioning.6 In this event, the officer
instead tells the story of the accused and, thus, a believable but not
necessarily true confession emerges. In a society that places
enormous emphasis on a confession, even in some cases where no
other evidence exists, a mentally retarded suspect faces a great
disadvantage because of his intense propensity to please others or
hide his impairment.6
The potential for false confessions only partially explains the
injustice faced by the mentally retarded in the investigation
process:
At various stages in the proceedings against them, criminal
suspects face important decisions about whether to waive
their constitutional and statutory rights, e.g. the right to refrain
57. Texas Defender Service, supra note 43.
58. Davis, supra note 56.
59. Texas Defender Service, supra note 43.
60. Ehrenreich & Fellner, supra note 7, at 24.
61. Id. One other explanation is that the mentally retarded suspect does not truly
understand who is responsible for an act and therefore confesses to the crime. Davis, supra
note 56.
62. Ehrenreich & Fellner, supra note 7, at 25. Many times, because mentally retarded
people go to great lengths to conceal their disability, a police officer might not even realize
that he is dealing with someone suffering from the condition. Id.
63.

Id.

64.

Id.
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from answering police questions, and the right to a trial by
jury. Before giving effect to such waivers, the courts are
obliged to determine, based on the totality of the
circumstances, whether the waiver was voluntary and made
with full awareness of the nature of the right being waived
65
and the consequences of the decision to waive it.
Traditionally, the courts have accepted waivers from the mentally
retarded without giving much regard to the individual's condition or
66
the condition's impact on the decision to waive the rights.
However, in reality, a strong argument can be made that a mentally
retarded individual lacks the intellect necessary to understand the
concept of a right, or more importantly, the consequences of
waiving that right.
A mentally retarded individual is more likely than an unimpaired
person to mistakenly relinquish the right to avoid selfincrimination. 67 To protect people from incriminating themselves in
the investigation process, the police must give Miranda warnings
to any suspect before they confess.68 To waive this right, a person
must do so knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.69 However, a
person with mental retardation often can understand neither the
seriousness of relinquishing this right nor confessing without the
advice of legal counsel. Many mentally retarded individuals do not
comprehend that they can choose whether to cooperate with police
and answer questions. 70 Furthermore, a mentally retarded suspect
may not even understand the language of a Miranda warning, but
because of the inclination to answer questions affirmatively, he will
often say that he understands the Miranda rights. 71 As mentioned
before, in our society, a confession strongly influences the
determination of the guilt or innocence of a suspect; consequently,
the idea that many mentally retarded people do not understand
their right to remain silent only underscores the notion of the
injustice of the criminal system with respect to the mentally
65. Ehrenreich & Fellner, supra note 7, at 22; see Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157
(1986); Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
66. Ehrenreich & Fellner, supra note 7, at 22-23.
67. Id. The protection from self-incrimination can be found in the Fifth Amendment to
the United States Constitution, which declares that "nor shall [any person] be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself;. . ." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
68. Ehrenreich & Fellner, supra note 7, at 22. Miranda warnings were established in
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
69. Id.
70. Ehrenreich & Feliner, supra note 7, at 22.
71. Id.
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impaired.
A defendant with mental retardation may lack an ability to
understand the complexities of the United States legal system.
Hence, the defendant may not be able to adequately participate in
his or her own defense. In fact, a person's mental retardation may
lead to the destruction of one's defense. A person with mental
retardation quite often suffers from a very poor memory.72 This
impediment, coupled with the tendency to fall prey to others'
suggestions, renders communication of the facts, especially the
most mitigating facts, to the defense lawyer next to impossible.73
Moreover, a mentally retarded person will often attempt to conceal
his condition from lawyers, not realizing that his condition could
constitute a major part of his defense. 74 Perhaps the most
significant disadvantage that the mentally retarded individual faces,
though, lies in his courtroom demeanor. A person with mental
retardation may not understand the consequences of the
proceedings; consequently, he tends to alienate the jury by
sleeping, smiling, or staring at nothing while in court.7 5 This
unavoidable and inappropriate conduct often conveys a false
76
impression of a lack of remorse or compassion for the victim.
In addition to having deficiencies in intellectual capacity or
possessing the inability to reason like non-impaired individuals,
mentally retarded defendants must also overcome the possibility of
ineffective assistance of counsel. On many occasions lawyers do
not possess the necessary skill level or education to properly
advise a mentally retarded client.77 Few lawyers have received
special training in communicating with a mentally challenged client,
and many lawyers simply do not want to spend the time explaining
the different stages of a case in unsophisticated language,
appropriately simplified for their clients to comprehend. 78 Balancing
the probable inadequacy of an average defense lawyer and the
vulnerabilities of the mentally retarded defendant, one can
vehemently argue that the chances of a fair trial for these
defendants are far less than those for defendants with normal
intelligence.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id.
Texas Defender Service, supra note 43.
Ehrenreich & Fellner, supra note 7, at 4.
Id.
Id.
Texas Defender Service, supra note 43.
Id.
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Through examination of the criteria for moral culpability in
individuals with average intelligence, one should recognize that a
mentally retarded individual lacks the degree of moral culpability
necessary to receive the death penalty. Because of their lesser
degree of moral culpability, derived from their sub-average
intelligence and poor ability to comprehend the wrongfulness of
their actions, mentally retarded individuals confront injustice in
police investigations and ensuing trials. Their hope for exemption
from execution lies in a consideration of the Eighth Amendment.
V.

THE PROTECTIONS OF THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT

Perhaps the most compelling legal basis for outlawing the
execution of mentally retarded persons lies within the Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment to the
United States Constitution. 79 Although the Constitution itself does
not provide a clear definition of cruel and usual punishment, the
clause's origin as well as the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on
related issues have combined to help clarify its meaning and
80
purpose.
The drafters of the Constitution borrowed the "cruel and usual
punishment" language from the English Bill of Rights of 1689.81 The
words of the English Bill were directed against punishments not
allowed by written law (i.e., those viewed to be beyond the
jurisdiction of the sentencing court, and those disproportionate to
the crime involved). 82 The Americans adopted this language
primarily to prohibit torturing and other "barbarous" methods of
punishment2s3 However, U.S. courts soon added that the clause
should be interpreted in a "flexible and dynamic manner," rather
than strictly applying it to merely prohibit what constituted torture
and barbaric methods of punishment in the eighteenth century.8 In
79. The Eighth Amendment reads: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
80. Lyn Entzeroth, Putting the Mentally Retarded Criminal Defendant to Death:
Charting the Development of a National Consensus to Exempt the Mentally Retarded From
the Death Penalty, 52 AA. L REv. 911, 923 (2001).
81. Id. at 925 (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 (1976));(citing Anthony F
Granucci, Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishment Inflicted: The OriginalMeaning, 57 CAL. L
REv. 839, 852-53 (1969)). The English Bill of Rights of 1689 was drafted by Parliament at the
accession of William and Mary. Id.
2. Id.
83. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 170. The phrase derives mostly from statements made during the
various state conventions held during the ratification process of the U.S. Constitution. Id.
84. Id. at 171.
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other words, as society's perception of decency evolved, so too
should the boundaries and protections contained within the Eighth
Amendment.
In Weems v. United States, the Supreme Court began to expand
85
the perimeters of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause.
Weems received a punishment of Cadena Temporal for the crime of
falsifying an official document.86 The punishment included spending
at least twelve years and one day in jail, wearing chains,
performing hard labor, forfeiting many civil rights (such as owning
property), and living under surveillance for the remainder of his
life.8 7 Weems contended that his sentence constituted "prohibited
cruel and unusual punishment" under the Eighth Amendment. 88 In
reaching its decision, the Court chose not to limit the protection
given by the Eighth Amendment to only barbaric torture, but to
also forbid any punishment that lacked proportionality to the
severity of the crime.s9 The Court declared that, "[t]ime works
changes, brings into existence new conditions and purposes.
Therefore, a principle, to be vital, must be capable of wider
application than the mischief which gave it birth."9° The Court
further explained that the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause
"may be therefore progressive, and is not fastened to the obsolete
but may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by
a humane justice."9 1
In Trop v. DuUes, the Court expanded on Weems. 92 Trop, a
private in the United States Army, received a sentence of three
years hard labor, loss of pay, and a dishonorable discharge after
being convicted for his one-day desertion of the Army.93 Moreover,
a few years later, Trop applied for a passport only to find that due
to his conviction and dishonorable discharge, he had lost his
United States citizenship.9 Trop argued that taldng away his
85. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
86. Weems, 217 U.S. at 364. The term Cadena Temporal derives from Spanish law and
was used in the Philipines at the time of this case. Id.
87. Id. at 366.
88. Id. at 359. The Court ultimately decided that this punishment violated the Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause and reversed and remanded the case with directions to dismiss
the proceedings. Id. at 382.
89. Id. at 368.
90. Weems, 217 U.S. at 373.
91. Id. at 378.
92. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
93. Trop, 356 at 87.
94. Id at 88. The opinion cites the grounds for loss of citizenship as Section 401(g) of
the Nationality Act of 1940, which states that:
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citizenship violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment. 95
The Court phrased the question before it as "whether this penalty
subjects the individual to a fate forbidden by the principle of
civilized treatment guaranteed by the Eighth Amendment." 96 While
the Court acknowledged that the exact scope of the Eighth
Amendment had not been defined, it recognized that the basic
concept behind the Eighth Amendment emphasizes the dignity of
man.97 The Court confirmed the right of a state to punish; however,
the power can only be used in a manner that does not extend
beyond the boundaries of civilized standards. 98 The majority
emphasized that "the Amendment must draw its meaning from the
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society."99 Relying on this interpretation of the Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause, the majority of the Court believed the Eighth
Amendment to bar the punishment of denationalization. 00 Although
no physical torture resulted from the punishment, the Court
reasoned that Trop's loss of citizenship implicated the Eighth
Amendment's protection from cruel and unusual punishment;
denationalization punishes a person more primitively than physical
torture because it expunges an individual's status in society and
leaves him stateless. 1 1 A punishment that deprives an individual of
citizenship - a right that has evolved over many years - is
indecent and intolerable to society, especially when imposed for
committing the crime of deserting the army for twenty-four hours.
After applying the Amendment to physical and mental torture, in
Gregg v. Georgia the Supreme Court examined the Eighth
Amendment in the context of the death penalty.' °2 A plurality of the
Court ultimately followed the earlier teachings of Weems and Trop,
agreeing that the Eighth Amendment should be interpreted in a
[a]person who is a national of the United States whether by birth or naturalization,
shall lose his nationality by-(g) Deserting the military or naval forces of the United
States in time of war, provided he is convicted thereof by court martial and as the
result of such conviction is dismissed or dishonorably discharged ....
Id at 88 (citing 54 Stat. 1168, 1169, as amended, 58 Stat. 4).
95. Trop, 356 U.S. at 88.
96. Id at 99.
97. Id at 100.
98. Id.
.99. Id. at 101. This language continues to characterize our understanding of the
Eighth Amendment.
100. Trop, 356 U.S. at 101.
101. Id at 102.
102. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 153.
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flexible manner that reflects society's evolving standards of
decency. °3 The Court further explained, however, that the
standards of decency as perceived by the public are not totally
conclusive; a judge must also determine that the penalty is not
excessive. °4 The Court defined "excessive" in a two part analysis:
"[f]irst, the punishment must not involve the unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain. Second, the punishment must not be
grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime." 10 5
After discussing the principles and considerations surrounding an
Eighth Amendment issue, the Court resolved whether the death
1°6
penalty for the crime of murder violates the Amendment per se.
In dealing with this issue, the plurality discussed the possibility that
the evolution of the standards of decency had made the death
penalty intolerable. 1 7 The question renewed an argument presented
in the case of Furman v. Georgia.0 8 Examining the argument, the
plurality concluded that within the time frame spanning the two
cases, Furman and Gregg, societal support for the death penalty
grew.' °9 The Court used the significant amount of legislation
permitting the death penalty as the best indicator of society's
endorsement, which partially comprised the Court's reasoning for
holding that the death penalty does not violate the Eighth
Amendment per se." 0
Despite holding in Gregg that capital punishment is not a per se
violation of the Eighth Amendment, the Supreme Court has used its
protections to render the imposition of the death penalty for
certain crimes and offenders unconstitutional."' For example, in
Thompson v. Oklahoma, the Court held that the evolving standards
of decency prohibited the execution of a person under the age of
sixteen at the time of his crime, after considering the lower level of
blameworthiness of a young person as well as the absence of a
103. Id. at 171-73.
104. Id. at 173.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 176.
107. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 179.
108. Id. (citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 258-69 (1972)). The argument in
Furman was accepted by two justices; however, three justices were unable to accede to that
notion. Id.
109. Id. at 179.
110. Id. at 187.
111. Kimberly A. Orem, Evolution of an Eighth Amendment Dichotomy: Substantive
and ProceduralProtections Within the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause in Capital
Cases, 12 CAP. DEF.J. 345, (2000).
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deterring effect by such executions. 112 Similarly, in Ford v.
Wainwright, the Court could find no reason to allow this
punishment by today's standards, or those standards held in
colonial times; therefore, the Court held that the Eighth
Amendment prohibits any state from executing an insane
prisoner.1 3 Although using different reasoning, the Supreme Court
has also ruled that the protections of the Eighth Amendment
extend to groups such as accomplices to murder and criminals
convicted of rape without other crimes. 14
The Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause
has been interpreted as a flexible source of protection that can
evolve along with society's standards and sense of decency. Can
this protection be extended even further to save another group
from execution - namely those suffering from mental retardation?
VI.

THE CASE OF PENRY v. LYNAUGH

The Supreme Court first visited the issue of the constitutionality
of executing the mentally retarded with Penry v. Lynaugh, a
landmark case in this debate."' In Penry, the Court directly
examined whether these executions violated the Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution."6
Penry consisted of the following details. While in her home on
an October morning in 1979, Pamela Carpenter was brutally raped,
beaten, and stabbed with a pair of scissors."1 7 Ms. Carpenter died
later that day while receiving emergency treatment."8 Before she
expired, Pamela described her attacker to a police officer and a
doctor at the hospital." 9 Her description led the police to suspect
Penry, a twenty-two year old male who had previously been
12
convicted of rape and had recently been released on parole.
The police arrived at Penry's father's house where he had been
112.
113.

Id.
Orem, supra note 111, at 352-53 (citing Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 409-10

(1986)).
114.
murder is
convicted
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Orem, supra note 111, at 354-55. The case extending protection to accomplices for
Enmund v. FRorida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982) and a similar decision for the criminal
of rape without more is found in Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
492 U.S. 302 (1989).
Penry, 492 U.S. at 328.
Id. at 307.
Id.
Penry v. Lynaugh, 832 F2d 915 (1987).
Penry, 492 U.S. at 307-08.
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staying. 121 Penry denied any involvement in the crime; however, he
voluntarily agreed to go with the officers to the police station. 122
Upon arriving at the police station, the officers read Penry his
Miranda rights and questioned him about a wound on his back. 23
After being reminded of his rights by the police officers, Penry
agreed to sign a search form to recover the shirt that he wore
earlier that day.'A
After retrieving the shirt from his father's house, Penry and the
officers went to the scene of the crime. 125 While at the crime scene,
Penry for the first time confessed to committing the crime. 26 Upon
hearing this confession, the police immediately placed Penry under
arrest and once again read him his rights. 27 Penry was brought
before a magistrate, and charged with capital murder.'2 After
having been informed about his rights, Penry stated that he
understood his rights and signed the warning forms.'2
On two occasions after his arraignment, Pen-y gave statements
to two different police officers.130 First, after being questioned and
warned of his rights by police Chief Smith, Penry agreed to give a
statement. 13' Chief Smith had the statement typed for Penry's
review and signature; however, because Penry could not read, the
Chief read the statement to Penry, who signed the document 32
Texas Ranger Cook received the second statement from Penry.133
This second statement described the crime in even more detail and
contained the Miranda warnings along with a statement waiving
those rights."4 Once again, due to Penry's inability to read, the
statement had to be read to Penry before he signed it. 3 5 These
statements formed the heart of the prosecution's case because no
121. Penry, 832 F.2d at 917.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Penry, 832 F.2d at 917. Penry had admitted to the police officers that he had
"done it." Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Penry, 832 F2d at 917. This statement described the crime in detail. Id.
132. Id. The statement was typed using notes that Chief Smith took during PenrY's
statement Id. Two non-police officers witnessed the reading of the statement to Penry. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. The statement also included Penry's confession to previous crimes. Id.
135. Id. Once again two non-police officers witnessed the reading and signing of the
statement. Id.
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physical evidence such as blood, semen, fingerprints or hair
samples linked Penry to the scene of the crime. 1 6
Prior to the trial, a hearing took place to determine Penry's
competence to stand trial. 37 At this competency hearing, a clinical
psychologist, Dr. Brown, testified that Penry suffered from mental
retardation13s As a child, Penry had been diagnosed as having
organic brain damage most likely due to trauma to his brain at
birth.1 39 Furthermore, Penry could neither read nor write, axl had
never finished the first grade. 14 Penry had been tested over the
years, and his IQ ranged between fifty and sixty-three, which
indicated mild to moderate mental retardation."" During his
examination of the suspect, Dr. Brown gave Penry an IQ test on
which he scored fifty-four. 42 Noting that this score indicated that
Penry possessed a mental age of six and a half years old, the
doctor further concluded that Penry's ability to function in society
equaled that of a nine or ten year-old child."" Despite these
findings, the judge found Penry competent to stand trial. 144
During his first trial, the court admitted Penry's confessions as
evidence. 145 Consequently, Penry raised the defense of insanity and
presented the expert testimony of Dr. Jose Garcia. 46 Garcia
testified that Penry's brain damage and mental retardation resulted
in "poor impulse control and an inability to learn from
experience." 147 Concluding that Penry suffered from an organic
136. Penry, 832 E2d at 917.
137. Penry, 492 U.S. at 307.
138. Id. In addition to Dr. Brown's testimony, Penry's relatives also testified that he
was beaten as a child and had behaved strangely as both a child and a teenager. Penry, 832
F2d at 917. Other writings about this case suggested that Penry's mother would severely
mistreat him: she burned him with cigarettes; locked him in his room for long periods of
time; caused him to uncontrollably urinate himself; forced him to eat his own feces on
occasion; and dipped him in scalding water in the kitchen sink. Id.
139. Penry, 492 U.S. at 307.
140. Penry, 832 F2d at 917.
141. Penry, 492 U.S. at 307-08. The AAMR formerly used a classification system based
solely on IQ scores. The four classes consisted of mild retardation - an IQ score of (50-55)
to (70); moderate retardation - an IQ score of (35-40) to (50-55); severe retardation - an
IQ score of (20-25) to (35-40); and profound retardation - an IQ score of (20-25) or below.
Id at 308 (citing AAMR, supra note 2, at 5).
142. Penry, 492 U.S. at 308.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Penry, 832 F2d at 917.
146. Id.
147. Penry, 492 U.S. at 308. Garcia believed that this brain damage was probably
caused at birth, but alternatively, may have been caused by beatings and multiple injuries to
the brain during his childhood. Id.
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brain disorder at the time of the illegal offense, Garcia conveyed
the impossibility of Penry appreciating the wrongfulness of his
conduct or conforming his conduct to the law. 148 However, the
prosecution introduced the testimony of two of its own
psychiatrists to rebut Garcia's opinion. 49 The state concluded that
Penry did not suffer from insanity although it did concur with
Garcia in that Penry possessed "an extremely limited mental ability
150
and that he seemed unable to learn from his mistakes."
51
Consequently, the jury convicted Penry of capital murder.'
The jury considered Penry's punishment by answering three
special issues:
(1)

(2)

(3)

whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the
death of the deceased was committed deliberately and
with reasonable expectation that the death of the
deceased or another would result;
whether there is a probability that the defendant would
commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a
continuing threat to society; and
if raised by the evidence, whether the conduct of the
defendant in killing the deceased was unreasonable in
response of the provocation, if any, by the deceased. 52

If the jury unanimously answered yes to all three of these
questions, then Penry would be given the death penalty.' 3 Indeed,
the jury answered affirmatively to all the questions and sentenced
Penry to death. 1'
Penry recurrently appealed the decision, finally reaching the
Supreme Court, which granted certiorari to resolve two questions
concerning the Eighth Amendment:
First, was Penry sentenced to death in violation of the Eighth
Amendment because the jury was not adequately instructed to
take into consideration all of his mitigating evidence and
because the terms in the Texas special issues were not defined
in such a way that the jury could consider and give effect to
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
1981 and
153.
154.

Id. at 309.
Id.
Id. at 310.
Id. (citing Tex. Penal Code Ann. Section 19.03 (1974 and Supp. 1989)).
Penry, 492 U.S. at 310 (citing Thx. CODE CrIM. Ploc. ANN., art. 37.071 (b) (Vernon
Supp. 1989). This is the old Texas law. Id.
Id. at 311.
Id.
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his mitigating evidence in answering them? Second, is it cruel
and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment to
execute a mentally retarded person with Penry's reasoning
ability? 15
The Court's rationale and conclusions for both of these questions
remain important in modem jurisprudence. For the purpose of this
comment, the Court's holding concerning the second issue is of
particular significance to challenging a state's execution of the
mentally retarded.
To support his claim that the Eighth Amendment's protection
from cruel and unusual punishment extended to him, Penry argued
that a national consensus against executing the mentally retarded
was emerging, which could justify excluding mentally retarded
offenders from capital punishment.'5 However, the state responded
by refuting the existence of a national consensus of a blanket
exemption from execution; moreover, a jury is best situated to
discern whether a defendant suffers from severe mental retardation
15 7
and possesses the requisite culpability for a death sentence.
In its analysis, the Court revisited prior cases that dealt with the
Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.
The opinion, written by Justice O'Connor, recognized that the
concept of cruel and unusual punishment implicated "evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society."'5 The Court explained that one must examine the
objective evidence of society's current feelings about a punishment
in order to ascertain the requisite standard of decency. 59 According
to Justice O'Connor, the most reliable objective evidence required a
6
review of the legislative action taken throughout the country.1 0
At the time of Penry, only Georgia had completely banned" the
execution of mentally retarded person who had been found guilty
of a capital crime.' 6' A second state, Maryland, passed a similar
statute to become effective on July 1, 1989.162 In its analysis, the
155. Id. at 313. On the first issue, the Court held that the jury was not adequately
instructed and was denied the vehicle by which they could morally respond to Penry's
evidence of impairment. Id. at 329.
156. Id. at 329.
157. Penry, 492 U.S. at 329.
158. Id. at 331. (citing Trop, 356 U.S. at 86).
159. Id. (citing Coker, 433 U.S. at 593-97; Enmund, 485 U.S. at 788-96).
160. Id. (citing Thompson, 487 U.S. at 815).
161. Id. See GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-1310) (Supp. 1988).
162. Penry, 492 U.S. at 334. The Maryland Statute also prohibits the execution of an
individual with mental retardation. MD. CODE ANN., art. 27 § 412(f(1)(1989). Id.
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Court compared two other cases where the issue of a national
consensus was discussed. 16 In the case of Ford v. Wainwright, the
Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibited the
execution of an insane person. 1' Concurrent with Ford, the Court
observed that twenty-six states had statutes that suspended the
execution of a convict who became insane after sentencing, and
additional states had adopted the common law prohibition against
executing the insane. 1' In Thompson v. Oklahoma, the Court found
that eighteen states had expressly established a minimum age in
death penalty statutes, and also commented that all fifty states
required the defendant to be at .least sixteen at the time of the
offense. 1' Therefore, the Court concluded that a consensus clearly
existed that capital punishment was an appropriate punishment
under certain circumstances. 167 While the Penry Court denied "bean
counting," the Court did maintain that including Maryland and
Georgia in the sixteen states that completely opposed the death
penalty at the time of Penry's appeal still did not constitute
sufficient evidence of a national consensus, unlike the factors that
existed in Ford and Thompson.'68
Additionally, the Court determined that statistical evidence of the
general behavior of juries could be considered in defining the
existence of a national consensus.'6 Penry offered no evidence of
any specific behavioral studies, but instead relied heavily on public
opinion polls.170 According to the Court, these polls could someday
find expression through legislation, and thus could be relied upon
in the future as more of an objective representation of society's
values. 7 ' However, at the time of the decision, no national
consensus against executing the mentally retarded existed for the
Court to side with Penry. 72
Although the Court heavily emphasized the objective evidence of
juries or legislatures, it has also considered whether imposing the
death penalty on certain groups violates the Eighth Amendment.
163. Penry, 492 U.S. at 334.
164. Ford, 477 U.S. at 408. See supra notes 113-14 and accompanying text
165. Id.
166. Penry, 492 U.S. at 334 (citing Thompson, 487 U.S. at 829). See supra notes 112-13
and accompanying text.
167. Id
168.

Id.

169.
170.
171.
172.

Id.
Id.
Penry, 492 U.S. at 335.
Id.
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The Court declared that when inflicted upon certain groups, the
death penalty "makes no measurable contribution to acceptable
goals of punishment and hence is nothing more than the
purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering" if it is
"grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime." 173 The
death penalty must serve two principle social purposes: retribution
and deterrence. 174 The retribution analysis has always centered
around the culpability of a defendant. 17 5 Penry argued that mentally
retarded individuals do not have the judgment, perspective, and
self-control of a person of normal intelligence. 76 These limitations,
coupled with an inability to learn from mistakes or to appreciate
the long-term consequences of their actions, lower the level of
blameworthiness
of mentally retarded defendants. Justice
O'Connor, however, stated that a mentally retarded person's
abilities and experiences can vary, and therefore, not all mentally
retarded individuals lack the level of culpability necessary for the
death penalty.' 77 Until a national consensus is established, such
determinations of culpability remain a question for a sentencing
jury.
In summary, the Penry Court concluded by pronouncing that
"while a national consensus against execution of the mentally
retarded may someday emerge reflecting the 'evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society,' there is
78
insufficient evidence of such a consensus today."
VII.

THE RETURN OF THE ISSUE TO THE SUPREME COURT

Twelve years after the Penry decision, opponents to executing
the mentally retarded long for the day that this indecent practice
will halt nationwide. Whether the nation has become intolerant of
executing mentally retarded individuals seems to be gaining
attention. The resurgence of this debate could culminate in the
Supreme Court the fall of 2001. After granting certiorari in
McCarver v. North Carolina,the Court will revisit and reevaluate
173. Id. (citing Coker, 433 U.S. at 592 (plurality opinion); Thompson, 487 U.S. at 833
(plurality opinion); Tison, 481 U.S. at 137; Enmund, 458 U.S. at 798-801).
174. Id. at 336. (citing Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183).
175. Id.
176. Penry, 492 U.S. at 336.
177. Id. at 339.
178. Id. at 340. Penry's case was remanded and eventually retried, and again Penry
received a death sentence. Penry v. Johnson, 121 S.Ct. 1910 (2001). In 2001, Penry's once
again faced the Supreme Court. His death sentence was once again overturned by the Court.
Penry, 121 S.Ct. at 1910.
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its holding in Penry to determine if now there exists a national
consensus against executing the mentally retarded, thus rendering
the punishment cruel and unusual under the Eighth Amendment. 79
Ernest McCarver received a death sentence after being convicted
for the murder of Woodrow E Hartley.Ito He faces this punishment
despite the fact that he was subsequently diagnosed with mental
retardation. McCarver has a full scale IQ of sixty-seven, which
places him in the category of mentally retarded. 8' In addition, his
score of sixty-nine on the Scales of Independent Behavior Test
places him with the independent adaptive ability of a ten year
old.'82 Furthermore, McCarver cannot perform everyday activities
such as ordering pizza or using a telephone book without
assistance. '8
In his brief to the Supreme Court, McCarver urged the Court to
examine the changes in society that have evolved since Penry. In
doing so, McCarver hopes that the Court will find that a consensus
has indeed developed across the nation to bar the execution of the
mentally retarded.' u In support of his argument, McCarver
identified state legislatures' transition toward outlawing the death
penalty for the mentally retarded.'8 5 At the time of Penry, only two
states, in addition to the federal government, banned the mentally
retarded from capital punishment. Since that decision, eleven
additional states have passed similar legislation. 86 Those thirteen
179. After the submission deadline for this comment, the Supreme Court of the United
States decided to dimiss the writ of certiorari that it previously granted to McCarver.
McCarver v. North Carolina, 122 S.Ct. 22 (mem.)(2001). McCarver's case became moot
because North Carolina passed legislation that banned the execution of the mentally
retarded. 2001 N.C. Sess. Laws 346. Because of the legislation's retroactive effect, McCarver
no longer has the requisite standing for his case to be heard by the Supreme Court. Death
Penalty Information Center, Mental Retardation and. the Death Penalty, at httpJ/
www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/dpicmr.htmil (last visited Nov. 7, 2001). Although the Court
dismissed McCarver's case, it immediately granted certiorari to a Virginia case involving a
mentally retarded death row inmate named Daryl Atkins. Atkins v. Virgina, 122 S.Ct. 24
(mem.)(2001) (amended 122 S.Ct. 29 (mem.)(2001)). In the order, the Court specifically
agreed to address the Eighth Amendment issue raised in McCarver. 2001 WL 1149397.
Because the legal issue involved in both cases is not fact sensitive, the arguments set forth
in McCarver remain germane and therefore warrant discussion.
180. Brief for Petitioner at 3, McCarver v. North Carolina, No. 00-8727 (U.S. filed Feb.
5, 2001).
181. Id. at 7. The psychologist conducted a series of tests while making his diagnosis,
including the IQ test and tests for impairments in adaptive behavior. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id at 7-8.
184. Id at 9.
185. Brief for Petitioner at 11, McCarver (No. 00-8727).
186. Id. at 10. At the time the brief was submitted, eleven states (Arkansas, Colorado,
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states, along with the federal government and twelve states that bar
the death penalty completely, comprise a majority of jurisdictions
that do not permit the mentally retarded to be executed. McCarver
believes that this is objective evidence of society's view, warranting
a fmding that the national consensus has risen, and, therefore, the
7
execution of the mentally retarded violates the Constitution.1
McCarver further advanced his argument by adding that objective
evidence of a national consensus extends beyond the state's
legislature. At the time of his brief, North Carolina's legislature had
not banned the execution of the mentally retarded. 188 However,
McCarver contended that plenty of strong evidence of a consensus
exists. For instance, a number of local municipal officials and
legislators have called for a moratorium on executions, and most
specifically mention concern over the mentally retarded. 18 9 The
North Carolina General Assembly has appointed a committee to
study the death penalty's application in the state, and its
recommendations include the elimination of the mentally retarded
as a group subject to capital punishment.' 9° Other organizations like
the North Carolina Bar Association advocate excluding a person
with mental retardation from the death penalty.' 9' Finally, results of
various public opinion polls add to McCarver's argument. 192 Today,
at least the citizens of North Carolina generally disapprove of
93
executing mentally retarded individuals.
Due to the importance of this issue to so many, a variety of
organizations submitted to the Supreme Court a brief in Amici
Curiae, supporting McCarver.' 94 The brief attempts to present
Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Nebraska, New Mexico, New York, South Dakota, Tennessee and
Washington) had joined Maryland, Georgia and the Federal Government in banning the
execution of the mentally retarded. Id.
187. Id. at 11-12.
188. Id. at 12. North Carolina has become the most recent state to pass legislation
protecting the mentally retarded from the death penalty. Death Penalty Information Center,
Mental Retardation and the Death Penalty, at http'//www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/dpicmr.html
(visited Aug 7, 2001).
189. Brief for Petitioner at 12, McCarver (No. 00-8727).
190. Id.
191. Id. at 13.
192. Id. The brief cites a poll of citizens in the Carolinas finding that 64 percent
favored banning the execution of the mentally retarded, while only 21 percent opposed such
a ban. Id.
193. Id.
194. Brief of The American Association on Mental Retardation, et al. as Amici Curie in
Support of Petitioner at 13, McCarver v. North Carolina, No. 00-8727 (U.S. filed June 8, 2001)
[hereinafter Amici Brief for AAMR et al.]. This brief was filed by The AAMR, The Arc of the
United States, The American Orthopsychiatric Association, Physicians for Human Rights, The
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compelling clinical, moral, and constitutional reasons why the
execution of the mentally retarded violates the Eighth
Amendment. 195 Because the writers of the brief recognize that the
Court evaluates the existence of a national consensus by looking at
objective evidence, the writers tried to provide detailed information
concerning public opinion changes over the years since Penry. 96
Although acknowledging the great importance that legislative
enactments have in these cases, the brief argues that the Court has
never held the state laws to be the consensus. 197 The consensus
derives from the American people's views on a particular
punishment, not the states'; the Court however, simply recognizes
that laws provide important evidence of society's evolution.'9 As
stated in the brief, "the States and their legislators are proxies, by
which the shared judgment of the American people becomes
manifest."'9 Furthermore, the brief explains that the Court's
decision will not totally rely on a straight count of laws for and
against an issue; instead, to arrive at the public's true sentiment, a
decision on a national consensus must account for the best
2
evidence available. 00
The Amici Curiae strongly believe that a national consensus
against executing individuals with mental retardation currently
exists in the United States, and present strong evidence that
identifies and confirms that national agreement.20' Moreover, the
absence of passed laws does not necessarily undercut the
evidence. 2° The various organizations responsible for submitting
this brief through one voice state that the evidence of a national
consensus is clear:
[The evidence] shows virtually no support for executing
people with mental retardation among legislators, either State
or Federal. It shows almost no prosecutors or judges willing
to state that they believe individuals with mental retardation
should receive the death penalty. It shows governors
American Network of Community Options and Resources, The Joseph P. Kennedy, Jr.
Foundation, The Judge David L. Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law, and the National
Association of Protection and Advocacy Systems. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Amici Brief for AAMR et al. at 16-17.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 18.
201. Id.
202. Amici Brief for AAMR et al. at 14.
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exercising their clemency powers to prevent execution when
they come to understand that a defendant has mental
retardation. And in an extraordinary array of public opinion
surveys, spread across the country, taken by different
organizations over a substantial span of time, it shows
overwhelming opposition among the American people to the
execution of any person who has mental retardation. A clear
majority of those Americans who support the death penalty
oppose its use for defendants who have mental retardation.m
The authors further assert that a shared moral belief exists that
individuals with mental retardation do not possess the requisite
level of culpability to justify execution. 2°4 Moreover, the growing
public awareness that mental retardation is not a condition caused
by the fault of the individual assists in formulating a national
consensus. 205 Finally, because a mentally retarded defendant's
behavior caused by his condition increases the likelihood that he
has strengthened an
may be executed despite his factual innocence
26
already morally conscious America.
VIII.

LEGISLATIVE TRENDS

The plurality's opinion in Penry asserted that legislative trends
most objectively represent a national consensus. 2° Since Penry,
significant legislative changes have occurred regarding the
execution of the mentally retarded. At the time of the Penry
decision, only Maryland and Georgia had banned the death penalty
for a person with mental retardation. 208 Currently, the number of
states whose legislatures have passed similar laws has grown to
eighteen. 2°9 These eighteen states, together with the federal
government and the current twelve states that ban the death
penalty altogether, constitute a majority of the jurisdictions in the
United States.
Although the most apparent objective evidence of changing
legislative attitudes remains passed laws, other legislative initiatives
indicate a trend towards eliminating individuals with mental
203. Id.
204. Id.
205.

Id. at 38.

206.
207.
208.
209.

Id. at 39.
Penry, 492 U.S. at 340.
Id.
See supra note 1.
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retardation from death penalty consideration. In the year 2001,
thirteen states have introduced or voted on legislation prohibiting
the execution of the mentally retarded. 210 While the proposed
legislation in Nevada, Mississippi, and Texas has not become law,
this failure does not indicate a lack of a consensus in those states.
In Texas, for example, the proposed law passed both legislative
houses before being vetoed on the final day of the vetoing period
by Governor Rick Perry.211 The movement gained enough support to
survive committee hearings and pass through both legislative
houses in the most infamous death penalty state in America, to
only suffer defeat because of one man. The veto does not diminish
the fact that a majority of the legislature recognized a consensus
against the execution of the mentally retarded. The fact that so
many legislative venues are considering the issue indicates
movement towards a consensus to ban the execution of the
mentally retarded.
Pennsylvania, like its sister states, is also considering the
controversial issue of the propriety of executing the mentally
retarded in pending legislation. In 2001, both houses introduced
bills disallowing a death sentence for a person with mental
retardation. State Senator Helfrick introduced Senate Bill number
twenty-six that was referred to the judiciary committee on January
22, 2001.212 A representative from Senator Helfrick's office indicated
that Senator Greenleaf, the chairman of the judiciary committee,
was asked to schedule the bill for consideration by the Judiciary
Committee in fall 2001.213 Hendrick's office remains optimistic that
the bill will pass this year as a result of the great emphasis placed
on the issue over the past eighteen months. 214 Concurrently, in the
Pennsylvania House of Representatives, Representative Fairchild
introduced House Bill number 1861 that was referred to the House
Judiciary Committee on July 11, 2001.215 According to Fairchild's
office, the proposal developed from the legislative initiatives
identified by a task force, which examined the mental retardation
system in Pennsylvania. 2 6 Representative Fairchild served as
210. The Justice Project, 2001 State Legislation on Death Penalty Reform at a
Glimpse, at http://justice.policy.net/relatives/18600.pdf (last visited Jul. 27, 2001).
211. Death Penalty Information Center, supra note 1.
212. S. SB 26, (Pa. 2001).
213. Email Interview with Todd Roup, Legislative Assistant with the office of Senator
Helfrick (Jul. 27, 2001).
214. Id.
215. H.R. HB 1861, (Pa. 2001).
216. Email Interview with Garth Shipman, Legislative Assistant with the office of
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chairman of that task force.21 7
While both pieces of legislation purport to address the same
problem, the two bills have one major distinction which carries a
severe and unfortunate implication. Senator Helfrick's bill defines a
person who suffers from mental retardation as "an individual who
has significantly sub-average intellectual functioning as evidenced
by an intelligence quotient of seventy or below on an individually
administered intelligence quotient test and impairment in adaptive
behavior, and that the mental retardation is manifested before the
individual attains twenty-two years in age."218 Contrarily,
Representative Fairchild's proposed legislation sets the Intelligence
Quotient barrier at sixty or below and an age of onset under
eighteen. 21 9 Although the differences may at first seem trivial, a
person who studies trends in mental retardation knows the
importance of such a variance. Most people with mental retardation
have an IQ between sixty and seventy; therefore, Senator Helfrick's
bill would protect all of the mentally retarded as defined by the
AAMR while Representative Fairchild's bill would only ban the
execution of a small portion of these people. The difference in
definitions, though important, fails to affect the consistency of the
underlying message contained in both bills: Pennsylvania should no
longer tolerate the execution of the mentally retarded.
Opponents to banning the execution of mentally retarded persons
may suggest that inconsistencies between these state statutes and
bills mean that no national consensus exists. For instance, while
most states limit the age of onset for mental retardation at
eighteen, Indiana's statute places the age at twenty-two. 220 Statutes
have also been inconsistent in determining who qualifies as an
examiner to present evidence of mental retardation, as well as who
hears that evidence. For example, while Florida requires the
appointment of two experts in the field of mental retardation to
evaluate a defendant, many states do not have any specific
guidelines with regard to who can evaluate a person possibly
suffering from mental retardation. 22' In addition, some states
Senator Representative Fairchild (Jul. 30, 2001).
217. Id.
218. S. SB 26, (Pa. 2001).
219. H.R. HB 1861, (Pa. 2001).
220. Death Penalty Information Center, State Statutes Prohibiting the Death Penalty
for People with Mental Retardation, at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/dpicmrstatutes.html
(last visited Aug. 7, 2001) (citing IND. CODE § 35-36-9-1 et. seq.).
221. Id. (citing FLA STAT. ANN. § 921.137).

2002

Execution of Mentally Retarded Criminals

require a certain IQ score for a diagnosis of mental retardation,
222
while other states, like Colorado, have no numerical requirement.
Opponents of the ban on the execution of the mentally retarded
argue that a national consensus against such punishment does not
exist because at this point, the nation cannot even agree on
defining the class of people to be protected. However the lack of
uniformity in the definition or criteria does not diminish the
message that legislatures are concerned about the issues
surrounding the execution of the mentally retarded.
CONCLUSION

Historically our criminal justice system has advanced a number of
purposes for punishment. One can consult almost any text on
criminal law and review discussions of retribution, incapacitation,
rehabilitation, and deterrence. A truly civil society attempts to
strike a balanced application of these theories of punishment. To
do so requires a system that permits the court to consider the
degree of culpability of any individual sentenced, while at the same
time protecting society from repeat predators. Recognition of this
balanced approach is evidenced by legislation throughout the
country. In recognition of the need to analyze culpability, states
have passed laws permitting different types of punishment for
those guilty of a crime but mentally ill, and procedures for
considering mitigating and aggravating circumstances in sentencing.
At the same time, legislatures have set minimum mandatory jail
sentences for some crimes and provisions for enhanced punishment
for repeat offenders. The same balanced approach should apply
when considering the propriety of the death sentence for the
mentally retarded.
No argument is made to excuse from punishment one suffering
from mental retardation, but instead to hand down the appropriate
degree of punishment. Advocates of the death penalty assert that
the degree of punishment should be left to the juries hearing the
individual cases. The problem is that such an approach subjects the
judicial process to the unpredictable prejudices and passions of
human beings generated by the circumstances of the crime
committed and not by any analysis of individual culpability. An
individual who has a documented condition so severe as to affect
his ability to function normally in society cannot possess the
highest degree of culpability reserved for those deserving the death
222.

Id. (citing Coo. REv. STAT. § 16-9-401-403).

402

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 40:373

penalty. Society needs protection from all criminals and some
retribution, but these needs can be satisfied with alternative
punishment, including life imprisonment without possibility of
parole.
The Supreme Court in Penry required proof of a national
consensus supporting this argument. The existing and proposed
legislation, calls for a moratorium on the death penalty generally,
and recent public opinion polls should satisfy the Court's request.
Joseph A. Nese, Jr.

